Along with the extremely effective main gun, the Tiger II major asset was the thick frontal armor. Even the side and rear armor protection was sufficient to eliminate any serious threat from the American 75mm or the Russian 76mm tanks guns.

It was quite obvious that no Allied tankers made a living by attempting to engage the Tiger II from the front.

The hull was welded, as was that of the Tiger I, but the armor was better sloped, using the experience of the T-34. Hull layout was similar to that of the Panther, and the large turret was roomy although the gun came right back to the rear wall and made a complete partition longitudinally.

The thickness and angles of the armor protection are shown in the Table below (Tiger I data are also included):

The front of the turret of the Tiger II could theoretically be penetrated using the 17 Pounder firing a special tungsten armor piercing, super velocity, discarding sabot round. These rounds, however, were not especially accurate, they did not have an explosive filler for blast effect after penetration, and ricocheted off steep angles like the lower hull front of the Tiger II.

The 88mm KwK 43 L/71 was a very accurate gun capable of first-round hits at ranges exceeding 1000 meters. The estimated accuracy is given as the probability (in percentage) of hitting a target 2m high and 2.5m wide, representing the target presented by the front of an opposing tank. These tables are based on the assumption that the actual range to the target has been determined. Firing on the practice range was more accurate than was normally obtained due to the stress of combat conditions. This difference is shown in the tables below by the figures in brackets.

The effectiveness of firepower that can be delivered by the main gun is dependant upon the penetration ability of the armor piercing rounds, inherent accuracy of the gun, characteristics of the gun sights and ability to get quickly and accurately on target.

Penetration statistics for armor plate were expressed in terms of the thickness in mm that could be penetrated when laid back at an angle from the vertical of 30°. The penetrating ability of armor piercing rounds fired from the 88mm KwK 43 L/71 was determined by tests conducted at firing ranges which proved that the results shown in the tables below could be achieved.

MAIN GUN DATA

PLEASE NOTE:
88mm KwK 36 L/56 : main gun installed on the Tiger I
88mm KwK 43 L/71 : main gun installed on the Tiger II.

1. ACCURACY:

Of the total ammunition load of 86 rounds (80 for the Tiger II with 'Porsche' turrets), the recommended ratio was 50% Pzgr.39/43 (armor piercing, capped, ballistic capped with explosive filler and tracer) and 50% Sprgr. (high-explosive shells).

Occasionally, when available, a few rounds of Pzgr.40/43 (high velocity, sub-calibre, tungsten core) were carried for use against the heaviest armored Russian tanks and tank destroyers. The Pzgr.40/43, without an explosive filler charge, was not as lethal after penetration as the Pzgr.39/43.

A fourth type of round was the Gr.39/43 HL (HEAT) which was based on the hollow charge principle. With far less penetrating ability, the Gr.39/43 HL was also less accurate than the Pzgr.39/43. However, the Gr.39/43 HL could be carried in place of Sprgr., and used as either an anti-tank round or as a an effective high explosive round against soft targets.

The sight for most of the that actually saw combat was the articulated, monocular Turmzielfernrohr 9d mounted parallel and on the same axis as the main gun. The gunner cloud select two magnifications, 3X and 6X. The lower magnification provided a wider field of view for target identification. The higher magnification assisted in precise aiming at long ranges.

Two adjustable range scales allowed the gunner to register the exact range to the target. The range scale for the Pzgr.39/43 was graduated at 100m intervals out to a range of 3000m and the second range scale for the Sprgr.43 was graduated out to a range of 5000m.

To quickly traverse the turret on to a target, the Tiger II was outfitted with a hydraulic motor for the turret drive. The speed at which the turret was traversed under power was dependant on the engine speed and selection of a low or high range by the gunner. With the high range power traverse engaged and the engine turning over at 2000 rpm, the turret could be traversed through 360 degrees in 19 seconds. At maximum allowable engine speed of 3000 rpm, the turret could be traversed 360° in less than ten seconds. The hydraulic traverse enabled coarse laying in order for the gunner to quickly get the selected target within the sight picture.

Fine adjustment was accomplished using the gunner's hand traverse and hand elevation wheels. If the power traverse failed, the turret could be traversed by hand by the gunner, assisted by the loader using an auxiliary hand traverse. The gear ratios for the hand traverse resulted in comparatively easy hand traverse for one man, even when the tank was on a three-degree slope.

Numerous statements have been made that the Tiger II was too heavy, too big, too slow, ungainly, unmaneuverable, etc. One is left with the impression that it was lucky to move at all. These banal generalities, stated as incontrovertible facts, are never substantiated by actual specifications, test reports or after-action accounts from the units that used the Tiger II. In spite of these frequently repeated remarks, the capability of the Tiger II to negotiate obstacles and cross terrain was equivalent to or better than most German and allied tanks as shown by the performance specifications below.

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS

The Tiger II initially experienced numerous automotive problems which required a continuous series of minor modifications to correct. These problems can be traced to two main causes: leaking seals and gaskets and an over taxed drive train originally designed for a 40 metric ton vehicle.

The problem of keeping a Tiger II in running condition was compounded by a shortage of skilled drivers many of whom may have never experienced driving any vehicle prior to entering the service. In addition they were provided only limited driver's training, and then usually on a different type of panzer, and received their own Tiger II usually within a few days before being shipped to the front.

Schwere Panzer Abteilung 505, who were issued their Tiger II in July and August 1944, reported that three factory-fresh Tiger II burnt out totally due to leaks in the engine compartment. Several other Tiger IIs had experienced smaller fires. The 505th worked closely with Henschel technical representatives to correct many of the deficiencies before sent to the East Front.

But, with mature drivers, taking required maintenance halts, and modification of key automotive components, the Tiger II could be maintained in a satisfactory operational condition. The statistics compiled from status reports for 15 March 1945 show that the percentage of Tigers operational at the Front was about equal to the PzKpfw IV and as good as or better than the Panther.

PERCENTAGE OPERATIONAL AT THE FRONT

Following an initial order for Three prototype chassis, an initial production series of 176 Tiger II was ordered in October 1942. Following cancellation of the Porsche Tigers in November 1942, the contract (with Henschel) was quickly expanded by an additional 350. Later extensions to the contracts increased the total order to over 1500.

In accordance with the original production plans from October 1942, the first Tiger II was to be completed in September 1943. The number produced each month was to be expanded to reach a target of 50 per month in May 1944. This production schedule satisfied the Inpekteur der Panzertruppen who wanted 100 Tiger II available for a spring offensive in 1944.

Due to delays, the first prototype V1 was accepted by Waffenamt inspector in November 1943. Two further prototypes, V2 and V3, and the first three production series Tiger II were accepted in January 1944. The production run continued through March 1945 for a total of three prototypes and 489 production series Tiger II produced by Henschel.

Tiger II Production Statistics

NOTE: There are some discrepancies between authors about Tiger II figures on Production and Deployment. In an effort to clarify this matter, I'm including Wolfgang Schneider's Table of Tiger II Deliveries by Unit . This Table can also be downloaded in both Excel 97 and HTML formats in a Zip file .

Production at Henschel was severely disrupted by a series of five bombing raids on 22, 27, and 28 September and 2 and 7 October. 95 per cent of the total floor area of the Henschel plant was destroyed by these raids. A further bombing raid on 15 December, again aimed at the factory, delayed recovery.

In addition, heavy area bombing raids on Kassel and vicinity, resulted in further disruptions to Tiger II production, occurred during the period of 22 and 23 October, and 30 December 1944 to 1 January 1945.

The bombing campaign had caused the loss in production of at least 657 Tiger II (940 planned versus 283 produced) during the period from September 1944 to March 1945. Henschel ceased all tank production by the end of March 1945.

After completing the camouflage, the crew fit the armored mudguards.

Tiger II were to be issued only to the Schwere Panzer Abteilungen (heavy tank battalions) of the Heeres (Army) or to the SS. The only exceptions to this rule were those issued for research (Waffenamt), training (Ersatzheer) and the first five production series Tiger II to a unit subordinate to the Panzer Lehr Division.

The standard organization called for 45 Tigers per battalion, three Panzerbefehlswagen Tigers with the headquarters and 14 Tigers in each of three companies. Each company was further subdivided, with two for the headquarter section and four for each of the three platoons.

Virtually the entire production was devoted to filling units to their full complement before sending them to the front. Only in 1945 were units sent into action short of their full complement of Tiger II.

Very rarely were replacements sent to units at the front. Tiger II replacements were only sent to three Abteilung; the sPzAbt. 506, the sSSPzAbt. 501, and sPzAbt Feldherrnhalle. A total of 194 Tiger II were issued to units that fought in the West, 274 for the East, 15 to the Waffenamt, and 13 to the Ersatzheer.

15 October 1944: Tiger II '233', of sPzAbt.503 on duty, overlooking the Danube.

Experiences and problems in employing the Tiger II on the East Front are revealed in the following report dated 25 November 1944 written by Hauptmann Fromme, commander of schwere Panzer Abteilung 503 :

"The Abteilung was loaded to move to Hungary starting on 9 October 1944 in order to complete their organization in the area of Budapest. The government crisis made it necessary to employ the Abteilung for the ocupation of the castle on 16 October. This was almost exclusively a demonstration but was thoroughly successful."

" Increased enemy activity east of the Theiss and near Debrecen required immediate employment. The Panzers were unloaded from rail transport in the Szelnok area, but because of a shortage of Ssyms-Wagen , not all of them arrived on time in the assembly area. Those that were unloaded immediately marched off to the assembly area in order to start the attack several hours later. The Panzers that arrived the next day were also concentrated in a Kampfgruppe , and attached to another Division, so the Abteilung went into action in two Kampfgruppen with different Divisions on different days with the intention of reassembling after successfully penetrating through the enemy defenses. Both Kampfgruppen were extraordinarily successful. From 19 October until the unit was reassembled on 23 October, 120 anti-tank guns and 19 artillery pieces were destroyed. The very tough and determined opponent (punitive battalion) was badly shaken by an energetic charge. Rearward communications were brought into complete confusion by destroying convoys and a transport train, which caused the Russian 6th Army to pull out of the Derbacen area. The entire stretch covered in this action of about 250 kilometers was achieved without significant mechanical breakdowns. In these battles, the Tiger II proved itself in its armor protection as well as mechanical reliability. It was not exceptional that Tiger II were hit up to 20 times without falling out."

"The following action was limited to small tasks, especially counterattacks with weak Infanterie forces against the enemy who crossed over to the Theiss northwest of Szolnok. However, these caused the Russians to forbid their units from conducting any major combat where Tigers were located."

"During this week, and continuing up to today, the Abteilung was not given time to perform maintenance in spite of urgent requests continuously being made. This was partially due to the situation, but also to partially due to the lack of understanding of the higher command to which the unit was subordinated, who always asked two questions: 'How many are operational?' and 'How many will be repaired in the next few days?' In spite of this, up to 30 October an average of 25 to 30 Tigers II were operational every day."

"After 18 November, the Abteilung was in action in the Gyoengyoes. Continuous bad weather made it almost impossible to leave the roads. Because the Panzergrenadier Regiment and Grenadier Regiment are too weak, the Tigers and also the Flak-Panzer usually had to stand guard in the main battle line without any sort of infantry close protection. Attacks in total darkness at night in non scouted terrain with infantry forces that were much too weak, capturing a city heavily occupied by the enemy infantry and anti-tank guns by a night attack with 120 convalescents and a SPW-Battalion with a strength of 40 men, were not unusual. These attacks were successful only if the Grenadiere actually accompanied the the attack in front and to the side of the Tigers ( to destroy the anti-tank guns that were frequently located in the doors of houses and gateways which couldn't be engaged by the Panzers) and if the infantry didn't crumble and desert the Tigers when when they met the first resistance so that it was easy for the enemy tank-hunter teams to fight the Tigers.

"In tank versus tank combat, the 8.8 cm KwK.43 gun is effective in destroying all of the types of enemy tanks, including the Stalin, at ranges up to 1500 meters. Under favorable conditions, the T-34 and T-43 tanks can also be knocked out at ranges up to 3000 meters. As previously experienced in the West with Allied tanks, it was often observed that the Russian tanks declined to fight Tigers or turned and fled after their first tank was knocked out. The same thing applies to the Russian assault guns as to the Stalin tanks. Kills at over 1500 meters have not yet occurred."

"In summary it can be said that the Tiger II has proven itself in every way and is a weapon that is feared by the enemy. The concentrated Tiger -Abteilung correctly employed tactically will always bring success. But most of the higher commands that were encountered did not perceive the technical and tactical importance of a Tiger-Abteilung ."

German Army policy during mid-1943 was to develop a self-propelled gun mount based on each new tank chassis design. This allowed the Germans the capability of mounting a much larger weapon on the chassis than could be fitted into a fully rotating turret. When Henschel designed the Tiger II, the firm also cooperated with Krupp in designing the self-propelled gun version of the Tiger II.

A wooden full size model was displayed in October of 1943, and the first prototype appeared in April of 1944. Two examples were constructed with a Porsche suspension similar to that used on the Ferdinand/Elefant tank destroyers.

Jagdtiger with Porsche suspension.

While this suspension saved manufacturing time and internal hull space, its components were more highly stressed and, on at least one occasion, a complete bogie truck snapped off the hull during testing. To ensure that production vehicles would be be rapidly available for service introduction, the standard Henschel torsion bar suspension was used for all production models.

Jagdtiger with Henschel suspension.

The new vehicle, designated at first Jagdpanzer VI, and then later the Jagdtiger, was assigned the type number SdKfz 186. It was basically a slightly lengthened Tiger II hull with a large box shaped superstructure mounted in the space where the tank's turret had been previously mounted. The front armor was 250mm thick, while the sides and rear were 80mm thick. The hull had 100 to 150mm front armor, with 80mm sides and rear. The top and bottom plates were 40mm thick. The superstructure armor plate and additional hatches, the ventilator, vision periscopes, and the gunner's sight were mounted in the roof of the fighting compartment. The driver and radio operator were both provided with standard Tiger II hull roof hatches.

The main armament of the Jagdtiger was the 128mm PaK 44 L/55 gun, the largest weapon fitted to a production vehicle during World War II. Capable of destroying almost any Allied heavy tank at near maximum range, this gun used separate ammunition to provide as much internal stowage as possible, with forty rounds of AP and HE ammunition being carried. Secondary armament consisted of an MG 34 machine gun ina standard Tiger II bow mount, and an MG 42 machine gun for anti aircraft defense. The MG 42 was provided with an elevated gun mount which fitted into a mount on the rear engine deck.

Specifications

The Jagdtiger was subject to frequent breakdowns, as the chassis and powertrain were severely overloaded by the vehicle's weight. Additionally, its size made it difficult to conceal from Allied aircraft, which had gained near total air superiority over Germany. The main gun was an excellent weapon, and those vehicles that were used from positions of good cover gave a good account of themselves. Even though the Jagdtiger suffered from mechanical problems caused by its rushed development and a lack of a more powerful chassis, it was a real engineering achievement.

A front shot of the Jagdtiger. The glacis plate was 150 mm thick, and the front superstructure a mind blowing 250 mm thick!

1. Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I & II: Combat Tactics ; Thomas L Jentz; ISBN 0-7643-0225-6
2. An Illustrated Guide to World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles ; Salamander Books Ltd.
   ISBN 0-86101-083-3
3. KINGTIGER Heavy Tank 1942-1945 ; Thomas L Jentz, Hilary Doyle and Peter Sarson;
   ISBN 185532 282 X
4. TIGER in action - Armor Number 27; Squadron/Signal Publications; ISBN 0-89747-230-6
5. The TIGER Tank; Roger Ford; Motorbooks International Publishers and Wholesalers;
   ISBN 0-7603-0524-2
6. The King Tiger Tank; Horst Scheibert; Schiffer Publishing; ISBN 0-88740-185-6
7. The "King Tiger" Vol.II - Development - Units - Operations; Wolfgang Schneider; Schiffer Publishing; ISBN 0-88740-287-9

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